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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
0. K. CLA 1, Ad1ninistrator of the 
Estate of AHNOLD I~ARTCHNER, 
also known as ARNOLD G. 
KARTCHNER, also known as 
ARNOLD GRANT KARTCHNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
STEPHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL 
H. STEVENS, BURNS L. DUN-
FORD and L. CLAYTON DUN-
FORD, doing business as THE 
DUNFORD BREAD COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. ; 
Case No. 7705 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's 
brief does not fully reflect all of the material facts of 
the case, and particularly those upon which the theory of 
defense was based, and for that reason we deem it neces-
sary to supplement the statement with the following: 
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As stated in the appellant's brief, this is a wrongful 
death case commenced by the personal representativE 
of Arnold D. Kartchner, deceased, against the defend-
ants as co-partners. The deceased suffered fatal in-
juries in an automobile accident occurring at about 316 
East 13th South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, at about 
4 :50 P.M. on the afternoon of June 24, 1950. There is 
little or no dispute in the testimony of the witnesses, and 
such differences as to the facts as there are between the 
two parties are largely differences in the inferences to 
be drawn from the established facts. 
Immediately prior to the accident the deceased had 
parked his station wagon automobile on the south side 
of 13th South Street, facing in an easterly direction and 
in front of the above mentioned address. (R. 104.) De-
ceased stepped from the left hand side of his automobile 
and was immediately_ struck by a delivery truck owned 
by the defendants and operated by Montel Mangum, de-
fendant's employee. (R. 105, 107, 108.) It was admitted 
in the pleadings that the truck was owned by the defend-
ants, that the driver, Mangum, was an employee of the 
defendants, and was engaged in the course of his employ-
ment at the time the accident occurred. (R. 1, 4.) Im-
media:tely prior to the accident Mangum had made his 
last delivery of the day at Jack Milner's Grocery Store, 
203 Hampton Avenue. At the time· of the occurrence of 
the accident, Mangum was returning to his employers' 
place of business after having completed his last call. 
(R. 170, 171.) After leaving Milner's Grocery, Mangum 
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proceeded easterly on Hampton Avenue to 3rd East 
Street and then turned right and proceeded southerly 
along 3rd East to its intersection at 13th South Street. 
(R. 171.) He stopped at the stop sign and waited for 
traffic on 13th South Street to clear and then made a 
left hand turn onto 13th South Street. Because traffic 
was son1ewhat heavy at the time, Mr. :Mangum made a 
rather wide turn so that his truck went over the southerly 
edge of the hard surface portion of the road and on to the 
dirt or gravel shoulder. (R. 171.) After completing this 
turn, Mangum proceeded easterly along 13th South Street 
to the point of collision which was some 167 feet east of 
the east curb line of 3rd East Street. (R. 67.) As :Mangum 
proceeded easterly along 13th South Street, he was look-
ing straight ahead along his direction of travel. He 
observed the station wagon automobile parked along the 
south side of the road, but he did not at any time see the 
deceased. (R. 171, 172.) According to his own testimony 
he was going about twenty miles per hour (R. 179.) 
Roberg testified that the truck was traveling "pretty 
slow." (R. 106.) There is no evidence in the record to 
the contrary. As he passed the station wagon he heard 
a thud on the right side of his truck and he thought that 
possibly "some kid" had thrown something at the truck. 
On stopping to investigate, he saw the deceased lying in 
the road. ( R. 123.) 
The plaintiff's theory at the trial of the· case was that 
defendants' driver failed to keep a proper lookout; that 
the deceased was standing by the station wagon auto-
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mobile as the defendants' driver approached the scene 
of the accident, but that Mangum failed to observe the 
deceased and negligently ran into him. 
It was and is the defendants' theory that the de-
ceased stepped suddenly from his station wagon and 
directly into the defendants' truck; that there was no 
opportunity whatsoever for Mangum to avoid the acci-
dent, and that the deceased failed to observe oncoming 
traffic or to take any precautions whatsoever for his 
own safety. Moreover, the deceased stepped from the 
left hand E,ide of his automobile directly into the street 
and the hazards of approaching traffic, when he could 
have, with equal convenience and much greater safety, 
alighted on the right side of his vehicle to the sidewalk, 
and free of vehicular traffic hazards. The case was sub-
mitted to the jury on the question of the defendants' 
negligence and deceased's contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk, and the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the defendants, no cause of action. 
There are some statements in the appellant's brief, 
to the effect that the evidence conclusively shows negli-
gence on the part of Mangum. To these statements we 
take exception. There is abundant evidence in the record 
to justify a finding of non-negligence upon the part of 
Mangum. Besides the testimony of Mangum above set 
forth, there is considerable corroborating testimony as 
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to the truth and accuraey of his Yl'rsion of the accident. 
Indeed there is no evidence to tl1e contrary except the 
impeaching testin1ony of l\[rs. Roberg. 
Officer Harold Peterson of the ~alt Lake Poliee 
Force, one of the officers who investigated the accident, 
testified that the truck left track marks along the south 
shoulder of 13th South Street and that these track n1arks 
were gradually moving from the shoulder of the road 
back toward the center of the road at the point of.impact. 
( R. 70.) This is corroborative of Mangum's testimony 
that he made a wide turn. 
The plaintiff introduced in evidence at the trial, some 
photographs taken by Officer Snell immediately after the 
accident, including pictures of the front and right side 
of the defendants' truck. (Ex. B & D.) Exhibit B is a 
view of the right side of the defendants' truck, and it 
shows an indentation on the right hand door post about 
three feet back from the front of the truck and about 
five feet nine inches high. Near this indentation were 
some colored marks which appeared to be blood spots. 
(R. 47, 48, 54, 55, 63, 72, 73, 87.) There are other marks, 
assumed to be blood spots, lower down on the same door 
post. (R. 48.) 
Exhibit D, which is a front view of the defendants' 
truck shows no marks of any kind. (R. 54, 73, 86.) The 
investigating officers examined the front of the truck 
and found no marks or indentations of any kind. 
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The testimony of Keith Roberg, is also illuminating. 
Roberg testified that immediately prior to the accident, 
he was engaged in conversation with the deceased. Ro-
berg was standing on the right hand side of the station 
wagon. His testimony as to what then transpired is as 
follows: 
"Q. And then what happened~ 
"A. And then as he got out he got hit. 
"Q. When he got out what did he do~ 
"A. He just closed the door and got hit." (R. 105.) 
(Italics ours.) 
His testimony was to the same effect on cross ex-
amination: 
"Q. And just as he got out he got hit, ts that 
right~ 
"A. Yes." ( R. 108.) (Italics ours.) 
From the testimony of Roberg that the deceased was 
struck immediately upon his alighting from his automo-
bile, together with the undisputed evidence that the 
impact was upon the side ra;ther than on the front of the 
truck, and the undisputed evidence that at the point of 
impact the truck was moving away from the station 
wagon and toward the center of the road, plus the testi-
mony of Mangum that although he was looking straight 
up the street and he observed the station wagon auto-
mobile but never observed the deceased, we believe that 
the conclusion is irresistible that the deceased stepped 
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suddenly and without looking, directly in the defendants' 
truck; that the defendant's driver had no opportunity 
to avoid the accident and that the deceased himself was 
guilty of negligence which was the sole cause of his fatal 
injuries. No other explanation can be reconciled with the 
facts, most of which are undisputed. 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO.7. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY THE QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON 
THE PART OF THE DECEASED. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, EITHER 
IN THE LANGUAGE REQUESTED OR IN MODIFIED FORM. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DlRECTED VERDICT. 
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ARGUMENT 
As we unde~rstand the appellant's argument, there 
is no contention n1ade that the evidence is not :;;ufficient 
to support the verdict. If we understand his position cor-
rectly, appellant's only contention is that the Court com-
mitted error in its instructions to the jury. It is respond-
ents' theory that there was no error committed by the 
Court in instructing the jury and further, if there were 
any error, such error would be immaterial, because the 
defendants were entitled to a directed verdict on the 
evidence adduced. 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO.7. 
Appellant first complains that the Court erred in 
giving its Instruction No. 7, which is as follows: 
"You are instructed that a person cannot 
deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal in-
jury, particularly when there is a safe course of 
action open to him, and then hold the author of 
the danger liable in damages for any injuries sus-
tained. 
"If you find from the evidence in this case, 
that the deceased, Arnold Kartchner, placed him-
self in a position of obvious peril when there was 
no reasonable justification therefor, then the 
said Arnold Kartchner is deemed to have assumed 
the risk of his course of conduct and your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action." 
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It is not altogether clear upon what theory appellant 
attack~ this instruction. Fnder Point I of his argtunent 
he apparently treats the instruction as one on contribu-
tory negligence and ~eem~ to argue first, that there was 
no evidence sufficient to warrant the giving of the in-
struction, and secondly, that the instruction did not cor-
rectly define the standard of care imposed upon the de-
ceased. ll nder Point III of his argu1nent, appellant 
see1ns to treat the instruction as one on the doctrine of 
assumption of risk. \V e believe that it was the intention 
of the Court in giving Instruction No. 7, to charge the 
jury on the defense of assumption of risk. The jury were 
adequately instructed by other instructions on the doc-
trine of contributory negligence. However, we shall at-
tempt to meet appellant on his own ground and show 
that there is no merit to any of his arguments. 
It is recognized in appellant's brief (page 32) that 
the same state of facts may give rise to both the defenses 
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. There 
could of course, be no impropriety in instructing the jury 
on both theories if the evidence warranted. It is further 
pointed out in the plaintiff's brief that assumption of risk 
involves a deliberate choice of a course of action with 
full knowledge of the danger. We think there can be little 
doubt that the conduct of the deceased amounted bo1th to 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and 
certainly the evidence justified instructions on both de-
fenses. 
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Appellant argues that there is no evidence in the 
record from which any reasonable inference can be drawn 
that the deceased placed himself in a position of obvious 
peril or that he deliberately incurred an obvious risk. 
The record shows without dispute that the deceased 
resided at 316 East 13th South Street and had resided 
there for a number of years prior to the occurrence of 
the fatal accident. He must, therefore, be presumed to 
have known what the traffic conditions were on the· street 
immediately in front of his residence. Certainly the jury 
would be warranted in inferring that the deceased had 
knowledge of these facts. There is also abundant evi-
dence in the record that traffic along 13th South at the 
time of day and place where the accident occurred was 
generally heavy. 
Mangum testified that he had to stop at the stop sign 
at 3rd East Street, to allow traffic on 13th South to 
clear. He also testified that it was necessary for him to 
make a rather wide left hand turn on to 13th South Street 
because the traffic was heavy. 
The investigating police officers testified that traffic 
along 13th South Street at that hour of the day was quite 
heavy, and the· plaintiff's Exhibit E, which is a photo-
graph taken shortly after the occurrence of the accident, 
shows a heavy stream of traffic proceeding along 13th 
South Street. Deceased must have known these facts; 
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and he would be chargeable with the connnon knowledge 
as to the danger of stepping from the safety of an auto~ 
mobile into a heavily traveled street without observing 
to determine whether any traffic was approaching. 
As said by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the 
case of James v. Florios, 248 :Mich. 153, 226 N.W. 852: 
.. "\V alking from behind and going beyond a 
standing vehicle into a pathway open to traffic is 
a fruitful source of accident and an ordinarily 
prudent man will in view of the possible danger 
in doing so, exercise the essential precaution of 
ascertaining whether the way is open and may 
reasonably be expected to remain open to his 
crossing." 
In Weaver v. Pickering, 279 Pa. 214, 123 Atl. 777, 
the Court said: 
"In the instant case plai.I1tiff seemed ob-
livious to danger and chose to walk by faith across 
a busy city street; in so doing he assumed the 
risk." (Italics ours.) 
It is next argued by the appellant that the language 
of the instruction placed upon the deceased a higher de-
gree of care for his own safety than that of reasonable 
care under the circumstances. In making this argument 
appellant has apparently misconstrued the language of 
the instruction. The first paragraph of the instruction 
was taken almost verbatim from 38 Am. Jur., pp. 845-6, 
Negligence, Sec. 171, and reads as follows : 
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"One cannot deliberately incur an obvious 
risk of personal injury, especially when pre-
ventive measures are at hand, and then hold the 
author of the danger for the ensuing injury." 
See also the sarne authority at page 859, Negligence 
Sec. 182: 
"A person who, by his own act, subjects him-
self unnecessarily to danger violate's the duty 
imposed upon all men to use ordinary care for 
their own safety and is guilty of contributory 
negligence. The law imposes upon a person, sui 
juris, the obligation to use ordinary care for his 
own protection, the degree of which is commensu-
rate with the dangers to be avoided; and one who 
voluntarily and unnecessarily assumes a position 
of danger, the hazards of which he understands 
and appreciates, cannot recover for an rnJury 
from a risk incident to the position." 
We do not see how appellant can argue, with any 
degree of logic, that this instruction is tantamount to a 
directed verdict for the defendants. The language clearly 
states that if the jury finds that the deceased placed 
himself in a position of obvious peril and that there was 
no reasonable justification therefor, then, in that event, 
the deceased assumed the risk. Under the language of 
the instruction, the jury was not bound to find that by 
stepping from his automobile into the path of the defend-
ants' approaching automobile, the deceased placed him-
self in obvious peril. The jury was merely permitted, 
(not required) under the language of the instruction, so 
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to find. Of course, in ad1nitting that the language of the 
instruction, would permit the jury to find that the de-
ceased did not place himself in a position of obvious 
peril we do not adn1it that the evidence would have war-
ranted a finding to that effect. 
At the conclusion of his argument under Point I, 
plaintiff cites a number of cases. We have carefully ex-
amined all of thes·e authorities and we do not see that 
they are at all germane to the argument. In all of the 
cases cited by the plaintiff the question presented to the 
appellate Court was whethe·r there was sufficient evi-
dence to warrant the submission to the jury of the issue 
of the defendant's negligence or whether the evidence 
showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. In none of the cases cited 
by appellant is there any discussion of any instruction 
in any wise similar to the instruction of which plaintiff 
complains in the case at bar. The holdings of the various 
courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff merely hold that 
under the particular facts of those cases, that the evi-
dence warranted a finding of negligence on the part orf 
the defendant, or, that the plaintiff was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, or both. In the' 
instant case both the issues of defendants' negligence 
and deceased's contributory negligence were submitted 
to the jury, and decided adversely to the plaintiff. Ap-
pellant having had the benefit of a jury determination 
of those issues, he is entitled to nothing more under the 
holdings of his own authorities. 
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It should also be observed here, that all of the 
cases cited by appellant are quite different on their facts 
from the case at bar. The most important difference 
is the fact that in all of the cases cit~d by the plaintiff, 
the evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff was in a 
position along side the road for a sufficient length of 
time that he could have been and should have been ob-
served by the defendant. As has been pointed out in our 
statement of facts, the evidence in the case at bar shows 
without dispute that the deceased was not in a position 
where he could have been observed by the defendants' 
driver, but, on the contrary, that he stepped suddenly 
and without warning from a place of safety directly 
into the pathway of defendants' approaching vehicle. 
We shall develop this point more fully under Point V 
hereof. Suffice it at this time to quote from two or three 
of the cases cited by appellant wherein the difference 
between the two classes of cases is shown. 
In Shannon v. Thomas (Cal. App.), 134 P. (2d) 522, 
cited in appellant's brief, at page 26, the Court said: 
"The situation here present is not akin to that 
which exists where a pedestrian is about to cross 
a street and thereby places himself in the path of 
danger or suddenly steps out in front of and in 
the path of an oncoming automobile or walks into 
the street or upon a railway track without looking 
at all as was the situation in several of the cases 
relied upon by respondent." 
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In Stephenson v. Parton, (Wa::;h.), 155 Pac. 147, 
cited in plaintiff's brief, at page 23, the Court said: 
••* * * If, a~ is contended by the appellants, 
the deceased was in a place of safety, and stepped 
in front of the autmnobile where there was no 
chance to avoid being struck, the deceased was 
guilty of negligence." 
In Hadley v. Simpson, (\Vash.), 115 Pac. (2d) 675, 
the difference was pointed out in the following language: 
"The facts differentiate this case from such 
cases as Hamblet v. Soderburg, 189 Wash. 449, 
65 P. (2d) 1267, and Estill v. Berry, 193 \Vash. 10, 
14 P. 2d 482, upon which respondent puts much 
reliance. Decisions of which those are typical, 
hold that a pedestrian is guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law (1) where he walks 
into the side of an automobile which was in plain 
sight at the time he said he looked and did not see 
it;-(2) where, without looking he steps from be-
hind a parked automobile or other object into the 
path of an oncoming car." 
The Court's Instruction No. 7 was based upon ample 
evidence and correctly stated the law. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10. 
For the convenience of this Court we set forth the 
trial court's Instruction No. 10, which was as follows: 
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"You are instructed that every person is 
hound to. the exercise of vigilance with the view 
to discovery of perils by which he may be menaced 
and their avoidance after they are ascertained. 
Every person is bound to use due diligence to 
save his person from injury by the negligent act 
of another. 
"If you find from the evidence in this case 
that the deceased, Arnold Kartchner, failed to 
exercise vigilance to discover the approach of 
traffic and particularly to discover the truck being 
then and there operated by Montel Mangum and 
that such failure to exercise vigilance was a proxi-
nlate cause of the fatal injury sustained by the 
said Arnold Kartchner, then your verdict must be 
in favor of the defendants and against the plain-
tiff, no cause of action." 
It is apparently the position of appellant that the 
language of this instruction placed upon the deceased 
a highe·r duty of care than ordinary or reasonable care. 
Appellant has apparently construed the word "vigilance" 
to mean a degree of care higher than ordinary or reason-
able care. Although the word "vigilance" has various 
meanings, we do not believe that it can be construed 
to me,an anything other than ordinary care, as used in 
the language of the instruction, taken in its context and 
in light of the other instructions of the Court. The word 
is defined in the American College Dictionary, page 1356 
as watchfulness. It is given the same definition in 
Black's Law Dictionary at page 1817. The first para-
graph of Instruction No. 10 was taken from 38 Am. Jur., 
page 865, Negligence Sec. 189, which reads as follows: 
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'"Every person is bound to the exercise of 
vigilance with a view to the discovery of perils 
by which he may be menaced and their avoidance 
after they have been a~certained. Every person 
is bound to use due diligence to ~ave his person 
from injury by the negligent act of another." 
In Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Vol. 1, pp. 
249-250, it is stated that ordinary care implies the use of 
such watchfulness and precaution to avoid coming into 
danger and such effort to escape from or mitigate it when 
actually in danger, as a person would ordinarily use for 
his own protection under the same c] rcumstances. 
A very similar case on this point is Mathews v. 
Du.dley (Cal.), 297 Pac. 544. In that case the court in-
structed the jury with respect to a driver's duty as fol-
lows: 
''You are instructed that a driver has no right 
to assume that the road is clear, but under all 
circumstances and at all times he must be vigilant 
and must anticipate the presence of others. The 
fact that he did not know that anyone was on the 
highway is no excuse for conduct which would 
have amounted to recklessness if he had known 
that another vehicle or person was on the high-
way. 
"I further instruct you that a person law-
fully and carefully driving upon a highway has 
the right to assume that all persons using the 
highway will also use ordinary care and caution. 
This rule allows drivers of motor vehicles to as-
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su1ne that 1notor vehicle drivers will obey and 
abide by the traffic laws and regulations." (Italics 
ours). 
In holding that the word "vigilant" was synony-
mous wit~ ordinary reasonable care, the Supreme Court 
of California said: 
"The gravamen of defendants' objection is 
directed against the use of the word 'vigilant' in 
the foregoing instruction, and counsel for the ap-
pellants quotes certain definitions of that word 
as given in several dictionaries. The word, how-
ever, has numerous significances and synonyms, 
depending upon the particular place and context 
in which it is used and also to the subject to which 
in its various uses it relates. One of the meanings 
given to this word 'vigilant' is that contained in 
the Century Dictionary, wherein it is defined as 
'watchful, awake and on the alert; attentive to 
discover and avoid danger, or to provide for 
safety; circumspect; cautious; wary.' If each of 
these synonyms of the word 'vigilant' has been 
employed in the instruction complained of, it could 
hardly, in respect to the duties of the drive,r of an 
automobile upon the public highways, be said to 
ha~e been erroneous. But, however that may be, 
the instruction complained of has been approved 
by the appellate tribunals of this state in anum-
ber of decisions, some of which are the following: 
Meyers v. Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 201 P. 471; 
Wright v. Salzberger, 81 Cal. App. 690, 701, 254 
P. 671; Truitne,r v. Knight, 83 Cal. App. 655, 661, 
257 P. 447; Alkus v. Davies, 86 Cal. App. 355, 260 
P. 894; Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308, 317, 
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237 P. 1066, and Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller 
Desk Co.. 197 Cal. 8:2, 99, 239 P. 709, 41 A.L.R. 
10:27. \Ye discover no prejudicial error in the 
giving or refusing to give any of the instructions 
of which the appellants con1plain, nor any o:ther 
error on the part of the trial court which would 
warrant a reversal of this case. 
''The judgment is affirmed." 
This holding has been consistently followed by the 
California Courts. ~ee the recent case of Caselegno v. 
Leonard, 105 Pac. (2d) 125, reviewing the decisions and 
reaffirn1ing the doctrine. 
In the case of City Ice and Fuel Co. v. Center, 54 
Ohio Appeals 116, 6 N.E. (2d) 580, the trial court in-
structed the jury that the driver of a backing vehicle 
should exercise "vigilance" not to injure those behind. 
The instruction was in the language of a state statute. 
On appeal the defendant contended that the statute was 
unconstitutional as not laying down a definite standard 
of care. The appellate Court held that the language of 
the statute could only be interpreted to mean reasonable 
care, which was a sufficiently definite standard. The 
Court also quoted with approval from the above cited 
case of Mathews v. Dudley; 
The word "vigilance" was used by this court synony-
mously with "proper look-out" in Conklin v. Walsh (Ut.) 
193 Pac. (2d) 437, 439. 
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The Court's Instruction No. 10 must be read in con-
junction with the Court's Instruction No. 1, whereby the 
jury was instructed that the defendants relied upon con-
tributory negligence as a defense ; Instruction No. 3 
which defined contributory negligence as want of ordi-
nary care; and Instruction No. 11 which ~dvised the Jury 
in effect that one negligent party could not recover 
against another. 
The use of the word "vigilance" in the Court's In-
struction No. 10, did not have the effect of imposing upon 
the deceased any higher duty than that of reasonable 
care, nor of misleading the jury as to the degree of care 
to which deceased should be held. The word "vigilance" 
could not import anything other than ordinary care, 
particularly when interpreted in the light of the Court's 
other instructions and the generally accepted meaning 
of the word. 
At the conclusion of his argument under Point II, 
appellant states that the cases cited under his Point I are 
equally applicable to his Point· II. We can only say in 
response, that they are equally inapplicable. All that was 
said under our Point I with respect thereto, is applic-
able with the same force under this point. As previously 
observed, appellant's cases do not involve the inter-
pretations of any instructions. 
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POINT III. 
THE COU.RT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY THE QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON 
THE PART OF THE DECEASED. 
As heretofore noted, appellant take the position un-
der Point I of his argument, that the Court's Instruction 
No. 7 was an instruction on contributory negligence. Un-
der Point III of his argument appellant contends that 
Instruction No. 7 was an instruction on assumption of 
risk, and from this premise he argues that the Court 
erred in giving the instruction for the reason that the 
defendants did not plead in their answer the defense 
of assumption of risk. Appellant then cites the general 
rule that instructions to the jury should conform to the 
issues presented by the pleadings and that ordinarily 
it is error to instruct the jury on issues not raised by 
the pleadings. 
It shouid first be observed that in taking exception 
to the Court's Instruction No. 7, the plaintiff did not 
assign as one of the reasons therefor, the submission to 
the jury of an issue not pleaded. Rule 51 U.R.C.P. pro-
vides as follows: 
"No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an i:p.struction unless he objects 
thereto. In. objecting to the giving of an instruc-
tion the party must state distinctly the matter 
to. which he objects and the grounds of his objec-
tion." 
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The 1nanfiest purpose of this rule is to draw to the 
attention of the trial court the particular grounds upon 
which an instruction is claimed to be erroneous, and to 
give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error 
which may have been committed. Although appellant ex-
cepted to the giving of Instruction No. 7, he did not state 
as one of his grounds therefor, that this instruction sub-
mitted to the jury an issue not raised by the pleadings. 
For this reason appellant is now foreclosed from raising 
the issue, and appellant's Point III is not entitled to be, 
and should not be considered by this Court. 
However, there was no error in the giving of this 
instruction. While it is the general rule that the instruc-
tions of the trial court to the jury should be limited to 
the issues made by the pleadings, there is a well recog-
nized exception to this rule. Where evidence is received 
without objection, or where the plaintiff.?.s evidence shows 
that he is guilty of contributOry negligence or assumption 
of risk, the other party is entitled to an instruction on 
those matters, even though not pleaded. In other words, 
the trial court may properly charge the jury as to matters 
which at the trial are treated by both parties as being in 
issue, and concerning which substantial evidence is in-
troduced without objection_, although such matters may 
have been insufficiently pleaded, or may not have been 
pleaded at all. 53 A.m. Jur. 454, Trial, Sec. 576. 
See also Johnson v. Gaughren (Wash.), 104 Pac. 
170, where the Court said: 
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"'The principal objections to the instructions 
given are that they are not based on issues made 
by the cmnplaint and answers, but it is a sufficient 
answer to these objections to say that the instruc-
tions w·ere based on evidence admitted without 
objection as if upon sufficient pleadings. In such 
cases the court will tr~ril the pleadings as the par-
ties themselves have treated them, as sufficiently 
broad to warrant the introduction of the evi-
dence." 
See also Hoffman v. Southern Pac. (Cal. App.) 258 
Pac. 397, where the Court said: 
"As a general rule the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff must be specially pleaded by 
the defendant in order that he may rely upon this 
defense. 19 Cal. J ur. 681, #104. But where 
plaintiff's contributory negligence appears from 
the allegations of his complaint or from the evi-
dence introduced in his behalf, this plea is avail-
able to the defense, although it is not pleaded in 
the answer. 19 Cal.. Jur. p. 681, #104, p. 697, 
# 119; 20 R.C.L. 182, #151; 20 Standard Enc. 
of Proc. 317; Green v. S. P. Co., 132 Cal. 254, 64 P. 
255; Kenny v. Kennedy, 9 Cal. App. 350, 99 P. 
384." 
The purpose of requiring a defendant to plead an 
n- affirmative defense is to give the plaintiff notice of what 
IJ the defendant will contend at the trial, so that he may 
en have adequate opportunity to meet the evidence. How-
ever, where, as in this case, the plaintiff's own evidence 
shows conduct on his part which would prevent him from 
recovering, it is not only proper to instruct on such 
matters, but to fail to do so would be error. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, EITHER 
IN THE LANGUAGE REQUESTED OR IN MODIFIED FORM. 
For the convenience of the Court we set forth in full 
the text of plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 3: 
"If you believe from the evidence that the 
deceased, Arnold G. Kartchner, was standing at 
the left front door of his automobile or was in the 
act of leaving or had just left his car by the said 
left front door at the time of the accident, and 
that said car was parked on or near the sidewalk 
running in an easterly and westerly direction 
on the south . side of 13th South, then the court 
instructs you that the said Arnold G. Kartchner 
was . in a place where he had a legal right to be, 
and if you believe from the evidence, that he was 
struck by defendants' truck at said time and place 
and the·reby was injured and died as a result of 
the injury, then the court instructs you that the 
plaintiff in this case would have a right to recover 
for the death of said Arnofd G. Kartchner in such 
an amount as you shall find under all of the cir-
cumstances as may be just." 
It require's no extended argument to show that this 
request was wholly erroneous and was properly refused 
by the Court. The request is tantamount to a directed 
verdict for the plaintiff. All of the premises set forth in 
the request were admitted or conclusively shown to be 
facts at the trial. The evidence shows without dispute 
that the deceased was in the act of leaving or had just 
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left hi~ car by the left front door at the tin1e of the acci-
dent, that the car wa~ parked near the sidewalk in an 
easterly and \H'sterly direction on the south side, of 13th 
South; and that the deceased was struck by defendants' 
truck and sustained fatal injuries. These facts all being 
established, it would necessarily follow under the lan-
guage of the request, that the plaintiff was entitled to 
prevail. :Jloreoyer, in the language of the request there 
is not even the slightest suggestion that the jury should 
be required to find negligence imputable to the defend-
ants, as a necessary prerequisite to a verdict for the 
plaintiff, nor that such negligence upon the part of the 
defendant was the cause of the accident. Neither is there 
any suggestion that the plaintiff would be prevented 
from recovering if the deceased were guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. The request is tantamount to saying 
if you find that an accident occured the plaintiff has a 
right to recover. We believe that no citation of authority 
is required to show that this is not the law. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
We believe that there was no error in the instruc-
tions of the trial Court, and that as a necessary con-
sequence, the judgment of the trial Court should be 
affirmed. If the Court is in agreement with us in this 
view, there will be no occasion for the Court to consider 
our argument under Point V. If, however, the Court is of 
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the opinion that the trial court committed reversible 
error in instructing the jury, it is our position that such 
error would be immaterial, because the defendant was 
entitled to a directed verdict under the evidence adduced. 
(A) Plaintiff Failed to Sustain The Burden 
of Proving That The Deceased's Fatal Injuries 
Were Proximately Caused By Any Negligence 
Upon the Part Of The Defendants. 
It is a fundamental rule of law, too well established 
to require citation of authority, that the plaintiff in a 
personal injury action has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was 
guilty of some act or omission constituting negligence, 
and that such negligence was the proximate. cause of 
the injury or death. See Whalen v. Mutrie, 247 Mass. 
316, 142 N.E. 45, where it was held that in an action 
for the death of a pedestrian struck by a motor truck, 
the burden of proof to show defendant's negligence is on 
the plaintiff, and such negligence cannot be inferred from 
the mere happening of the accident. 
It is the general rule that the driver of an auto-
mobile is not liable for injuries to a pedestrian received 
when such pedestrian collides with the side of the auto-
mobile when alighting from another automobile or step-
ping suddenly from in front of or behind another auto-
mobile. A driver of an automobile is not bound to 
anticipate that a pedestrian may suddenly run from 
behind a parked automobile into his car or into the 
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path of it, or do the same in alighting from a car, in 
the absence of anything to put him on notice that such 
an event is likely to occur. 5 Am. Jur. 610, 612, Auto-
mobiles, Sec. 191, 196. 
As has been pointed out in our statement of facts, 
the evidence in this case is clear and undisputed that 
the deceased stepped suddenly from his parked station 
wagon automobile directly into the side of the defend-
ants' truck. The accident occurred almost simultane-
ously with deceased's alighting from his car. There is 
no evidence in the record whatsoever to show that the 
deceased had been standing at the side of his car for a 
sufficient length of time to have been observed by the 
defendants' driver. All of the evidence is to the con-
trary. 
There were only three eye witnesses to the acci-
dent. The driver of defendants' truck, Mangum, testi-
fied that although he was looking straight ahead along 
the road and observed the parked station wagon auto--
mobile, he did not see any person standing in the. vicinity 
of the station wagon. Keith Roberg, a nine year old boy 
who was talking to the deceased immediately prior to 
the occurrence of the accident, testified that as deceased 
got out he was hit. His testimony quite clearly showed 
that there was no substantial interval between the 
moment that the deceased alighted from his station 
wagon and the moment of impact. Ross Bradshaw, who 
was driving westerly along 13th South Street and ap-
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proached the scene of the accident from the east, testi-
fied that he observed the deceased for less than a second 
prior to the actual occurrence of the accident. 
The evidence also shows quite conclusively that the 
point of impact was on the side of the defendants' truck 
and not on the front, and the testimony of the investigat-
ing police officers shows that the truck was moving away 
from deceased's station wagon and toward the center 
of the road at the point of impact. 
The only evidence in the record, which in any wise 
tends to indicate any negligence on the part of Mangum 
is the testimony of Mrs. Roberg to the effect that a few 
days after the occurrence~ of the accident, Mr. Mangum 
sta~ed in her presence that he was looking down at the 
seat at the time of the accident. But even if from this 
shred of evidence the jury would be justified in finding 
that the defendants' driver was guilty of negligence in 
failing to keep a proper lookout, there is still no evidence 
whatsoever that such negligence was the cause of the 
accident. All of the facts and circumstances show quite 
clearly that no matter how vigilant Mangum might have 
been, he could not possibly have averted the accident. 
The case of Chipokas v. Peterson, 219 Iowa 1072, 
260 N.W. 37, is somewhat similar on its facts. There, 
as here, it was contended by the plaintiff that the de-
fendant failed to keep a proper lookout. In that case 
the plaintiff, a child, ran either in front or in back of a 
car parked along side the curb about one foot from the 
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curb line. The defendant never did see the child who 
ran suddenly and unexpectedly into the path of his 
automobile. Under these eircumstances the Supreme 
Court of Iowa held that the plaintiff had failed to prove 
negligence on the part of the defendant. 
In Rittle v. Zeller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, the Court 
said: 
"Our courts have repeatedly and consistently 
held that drivers of autos cannot be expected 
to anticipate the sudden appearance of a child 
from behind an automobile or some similar ob-
struction to view." 
For other cases to the same effect see : 
McAteer v. Highland Coffee Co., 291 Pa. 32, 
139 A. 585; 
Grein v. Gordon, 280 Pa. 576, 124 A. 737; 
Monroe v. Eager, 16 La. App. 540, 131 So. 
719; 
Rodriquez v. Abadie (La. App.), 168 So. 515; 
Sundbery v. Ber (La. App.), 162 So. 85; 
Watson v. Home Mut. Ins. Assoc., 215 Ia. 670, 
246 N.W. 655; 
Messick v. Mason, 156 Va. 193, 157 S.E. 575; 
Howk v. Anderson, 218 Ia. 358, 253 N.W. 32; 
Crutchley v. Bruce, 214 Ia. 731, 240 N.W. 238; 
Klink v. Bany (Ia.), 224 N.W. 540; 
Bishard v. Engelbeck, 180 Ia. 1132, 164 N.W. 
203. 
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(B) The Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contribu-
tory Negligence As A Matter Of Law. 
It is well settled that a pedestrian who suddenly 
steps into the street from behind a standing automobile; 
immediately in front of a car being driven along the 
highway is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law and is not entitled to recover for the resulting 
injuries. The rule is, of course, the same where a 
pedestrian steps into the pathway of an approaching 
vehicle from inside a parked vehicle. The basis of the 
rule is that the plaintiff has failed to exercise a proper 
lookout for his own safety. 1 Shearman & Redfield on 
Negligence, 324; 5 Am. J ur. 610, 764, Automobiles, ## 
191, 462. 
The cases in support of the rule are legion. As illus-
trative, we quote below from a few of the cases on this 
point: 
Standard Oil of Kentucky v. Noakes, 59 Fed. 2nd, 
897: 
. "There can be no doubt that one who crosses 
a street between intersections and from behind a 
parked car, which not only obstructs his view but 
also the view of drivers of approaching cars, is 
under a duty to look in the direction from which 
danger may be expected, and the failure to do 
so is negligence which will defeat recovery if 
accident results. This must be so if reason and 
common sense are to be applied in measuring 
human conduct, and if experience and o bserva-
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tion are of aid to judgment. 'Walking frmn 
behind and going beyond a standing vehicle into 
a pathway open to traffic is a fruitful source of 
accident.' J runes vs. Florios, 248 Mich. 153, 226 
N.\V. ~5~, ~53. 'The time has come when ordinary 
care requires a pedestrian to look for approach-
ing automobiles before he leaves the zone of 
safety.' :Mertens v. Lake Shore Yellow Cab & 
Transfer Co., 195 Wis. 646, 218 N.W. 85, 86." 
Dando v. Brobst, 318 Pa. 325, 177 A. 831: 
"The accident occurred about one o'clock in 
the afternoon of a dry day, and it is not claimed 
that plaintiff's vision was in any way obscured. 
Under these circumstances, plaintiff must in-
evitably have seen the car if she had looked, and 
if she saw nothing she could not have been look-
ing. As we have repeatedly pointed out it is vain 
for a person to say he looked when, in spite of 
what his eyes have told him, he moved into the 
path of an approaching car or train by which he 
was immediately struck. 
"The duty to look rests at all times upon 
everyone in the use of streets * * * [citations 
omitted] * * * and when one steps into a busy 
street and is immediately struck by a passing 
vehicle which he could have seen had he looked, he 
is barred by his own negligence * * * [citations 
omitted]. 
"In any case, however, plaintiff was under a 
duty to look before stepping into the street, and 
since the 'incontrovertible physical facts' show 
that the car was almost upon her when she step-
ped from the curb and that she would certainly 
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have seen it if she had looked, it is plain that 
she must have failed to look. Her own negligence 
* * * bars her recovery." (Italics ours). 
The above case was quoted with approval in Coval-
eskie v. Schimpf, 322 Pa. 65, 185 A. 196. 
239: 
Woods v. Moore (Mo. App.), 48 S.W. 2nd 202: 
"Not to see what is plainly visible when there 
is a duty to look constitutes negligence. If, on the 
other hand, as all the defendant's witnesses 
testified, plaintiff did not look at any time, until 
just before he was struck, when there was a duty 
imposed upon him to look, he was likewise guilty 
of negligence." 
Matassa v. Economy Cab Co. (La. App.), 158 So. 
"* * * we are satisfied that plaintiff had the 
sante opportunity of seeing the cab that its driver 
had of seeing plaintiff; * * * that the proximate 
cause of the accident was the negligence of plain-
tiff in passing behind the bakery truck into the 
line of the approaching cab so close to it that the 
driver could not see him in time to give warning 
or to avoid striking him; * * *" (Italics ours). 
Woods v. Pace, 220 App. Div. 386, 222 N.Y.S. 157: 
"If it could be argued that the defendant 
ought to have seen plaintiff in this place, where 
pedestrians were not expected- to be, how can the 
plaintiff be excused from seeing the automobile 
where west bound traffic would be expected to be. 
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If a jury could find that defendant should have 
seen tli.e plaintiff and avoided hitting him, it must 
likewise find that the plaintiff should have seen 
the defendant'~ auton1obile and avoided being 
hit." 
Hamblet c. Soderbttrg, 189 \Vash. 449, 65 Pac. 
(2d) 1267, 1269: 
"Present-day traffic upon our streets and 
highways is of such a nature that the duty of 
reasonable care, which rests upon all, requires 
in aln1ost any conceivable situation, a fairly effi-
cient attempt at observation before a pedestrian 
steps into the path of vehicular traffic. 
"Where, as here, no attempt at observation 
is made and especially where one steps out from 
behind an obscuring object, the pedestrian is 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
"This conclusion seems to be self evident, but 
reference may be had to the following of our 
cases which, in principle at least, sustain our 
present holding: Jones v. Seattle, 144 Wash. 188, 
257 P. 393; Gottstein v. Daly, 166 Wash. 582, 
7 P. (2d) 610. 
"Even had there been testimony that Mrs. 
Hamblet had looked but did not see the approach-
ing automobile, still there could have been no 
recoyery. Silverstein v. Adams, 134 Wash. 430, 
235 P. 784; Steinheim v. Nicholas, 171 Wash. 
614, 18 P. (2d) 836." 
In Chase v. Thomas (Cal. App.), 46 Pac. (2d) 200, 
201, the Court, holding plaintiff guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, observed: 
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"It appears from the evidence that plaintiff 
had gone to the rear of his truck, where he took 
out a laundry bag, closed the doors, and stepped 
further into the street toward the north. He 
testified that he was not more than a foot or 18 
inches from the fender of his truck at the time 
he was struck by the automobile, which was travel-
ing east." 
A case strikingly similar in point of fact to the case 
at bar is Will v. Boston Elevated Railroad Co., 247 
Mass. 250, 142 N.E. 44. In that case the plaintiff was 
a guest passenger in the rear seat of an automobile. 
The driver of the car stopped the automobile on the right 
hand side of the street and as close to the edge of the 
street as he could get. The plaintiff opened the door on 
the left side of the automobile, and, as he was getting 
out, a trolley car approaching from the rear struck the 
automobile on the left hand side and injured the plain-
tiff. The street was straight for a distance of some 400 
feet to the rear of the parked automobile. The court 
held the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law. 
The Court said in that case,: 
"There was no evidence to support a finding 
of due care on the part of the plaintiff. His own 
testimony was that he alighted from the auto-
mobile into the pathway of the trolley car, with-
out looking to see if any car was coming; that 
he did not hear or see the car or know anything 
about it until it struck him. His view was un-
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ob~tructed * * * It is manifest that the slightest 
attention to his own safety would have prevented 
his injury. While he might depend to a reason-
able extent on the expectation that the motor-
Ulan would not be negligent, he was not justified 
in abandoning all precautions for self protection. 
• • • It does not appear that the plaintiff had any 
knowledge of the precise position of the auto-
Inobile with reference to the trolley car or relied 
upon it in any degree. The plaintiff was in a 
place of entire safety withi.n the automobile. He. 
voluntarily and without exigency moved into a 
danger .zone by getting in front of an oncoming 
trolley car, which must have been in plain sight 
and very near when he opened the door of the 
automobile and got out." (Italics ours). 
The doctrine of the above case was reaffirmed in 
the recent case of Woodward v. City (Mass.), 76 N.E. 
(2d) 656. 
A case citing and discussing many of the authorities 
on this question, which we commend to the Court, is 
Cooper & Co. v. American Can Co., 130 Me. 76, 153 Atl. 
889. 
Although the case of Mingus v. Olsson (S. Ct. of Ut. 
1949), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, is not precisely similar on its 
facts to the case at bar the language used by the Court 
in that case is similar to that used by other courts and 
is appropriate here: 
Justice Wolfe, speaking for the Court, said at pages 
498-9: 
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that deceased did not look, is the further evi-
dence that deceased neither said nor did any-
thing to indicate that he was at all aware of the 
danger presented by defendant's approaching 
auton1obile. He seems to have been wholly un-
aware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing 
either to warn his wife, nor to rescue either him-
self or her from their position of peril. On this 
evidence, it must be said as a matter of law that 
deceased either failed to look, or having looked, 
failed to see what he should have seen. 
"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian 
who undertakes to cross a busy street of a large 
city, without first observing for vehicular traffic 
is guilty of contributory n~gligence. * * * A 
pedestrian crossing a public street in a crosswalk 
or pedestrian lane, although he may have the right 
of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the 
duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent 
neglected that duty in this case. It follows that 
he was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. Of course we do not mean to imply that a 
mere glance in the direction of the approaching 
automobile would suffice. The duty to look has 
inherent in it the duty to see what is there to be 
seen, and to pay heed to it." 
See also the language in the concurring op1n1on 
of Mr. Justice Wade at page 499 : 
"I agree that under the evidence here, de-
cedent was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law, because the evidence shows that 
he walked directly into the course of an approach-
ing autmnobile without taking any precaution 
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to prevent being struck thereby, since the auto~ 
n1obile had its headlights lighted so that he could 
haYe seen it approaching and waited in a place 
of safety and thereby avoided the accident. Even 
had decedent looked to see if there was an auto-
nwbile approaching, this would not have exon-
erated hun frmn negligence. As long as he walked 
direetly into the course of an approaching auto-
mobile without taking any precaution for his 
safety, it would 1nake no difference whether he 
looked or failed to look for approaching traffic. 
If he looked and inattentively failed to see the 
approaching car or absentmindedly failed to 
realize his danger, or he realized his danger but 
still continued on into the course of the car, he 
would be in the same situation as to contributory 
negligence as though he failed to look at all." 
For other cases, illustrative of the proposition that 
a plaintiff who steps suddenly from a concealed posi-
tion, imrnediately in front of an approaching car is 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, we 
invite the Court's attention to the following cases on 
this point: 
Dobrowolski v. Henderson, 15 La. App. 79, 
130 So. 237; 
Stawsky v. Wheaton, 220 Ia. 981, 263 N.W. 
313; 
McAteer v. Highland Coffee Co., 291 Pa. 32, 
139 A. 585; 
Pierce v. Hosrnan, 201 Ky. 278, 256 S.W. 397; 
Deal v. Snyder, 203 Mich. 273, 168 N.W. 973; 
Letts v. Cole, 310 Pa. 509, 165 A. 84 7; 
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Ko0ck v. Goodnight (Tex. Civ. App.), 71 S.W. 
(2d) 927; 
Jarvis v. Stone, 216 Ia. 27, 247 N.W. 393; 
Runge v. Haller, 236 Ky. 423, 33 S.W. (2d) 
317; 
Pettijohn v. Weede (Ia.), 227 N.W. 824; 
Hayes v. Gunter Bros. Lumber Co., 14 La. 
A pp. 402, 129 So. 401 ; 
Hughes v. Torregrossa, 278 :Mass. 530, 180 
N.E. 304; 
1\faranta v. vYenzelberg, 241 App. Div. 420, 
272 N.Y.S. 710; Affd. 267 N.Y. 510, 196 
N.E. 554; -
Ponder v. Carroll, 193 Ark. 1120, 105 S.W. 
(2d) 72; 
Beaucage v. Roak, 130 Me. 114, 153 A. 894; 
Rittle v. Zeller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 516; 
James v. Florios, 248 Mich. 153, 226 N.,V. 852; 
Mertens v. Lake Shore Yellow Cab & Transfer 
Co., 195 Wis. 646, 218 N."\V. 85; 
Harder v. Matthews, 67 Wash. 487, 121 Pac. 
983; 
Weaver v. Pickering, 279 Pa. 214, 123 A. 777; 
Conrad v. Green (N.J. Sup.), 94 A. 390; 
Fulton v. Mohr, 200 Mich. 538, 166 N.W. 851; 
Di Stephano v. Smith (R.I.), 102 A. 817; 
Owens v. Tisdale (La. App.), 153 So. 564. 
The plaintiff has effectually admitted contributory 
negligence on the part of the deceased in his own brief. 
At page 17 of plaintiff's brief it is said: "There is not 
a word of evidence to show th~t the deceased either 
knew the truck was approaching the parking area or 
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that it was coming toward his position." We are· con-
strained to agree with this state1nent. In fact we might 
go further and say the eYidence quite clearly shows that 
the deceased did not know of the immediate approach 
of the defendants' truck, notwithstanding there was 
nothing obstructing his vision and that the most casual 
glance to his rear would have revealed the danger. 
Appellant says further (also at page 17), "It is undoubt-
edly true that it would have been safer for the deceased 
to haYe gotten out of the right hand side of his car. 
* * *" It is well settled that where a person has a choice 
of methods of doing an act which are equally available, 
he is deemed negligent if he selects the more dangerous 
of the methods, in the absence of any showing of the 
existence of an emergency, sudden peril or other cir-
cumstances justifying such choice. 38 Am. Jur., Negli-
gence Sec. 193; Raymond v. U. P.R. Co. (Ut.), 191 Pac. 
(2d) 137. 
Again on page 18 of appellant's brief, he states 
that there is nothing to indicate that when the deceased 
got out of his car that he knew the bread truck was 
going to strike him down. In Vol. 1, Shearman & Redfield 
on Negligence, 242, ~t is said: 
"It is not enough that the plaintiff should 
act prudently in view of the knowledge which he 
actually had. He is responsible for his ignorance 
of that which he ought to have known." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed no error in its instructions 
to the jury. The plaintiff failed to sustain the burden 
of proving that the defendants were guilty of negligence 
which was the proximate cause of the accident; and the 
deceased's own contributory negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of his death. The judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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